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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Acquisitions As Investments 
There has been a great deal of activity and interest in 
the corporate takeover market in recent years. Several 
general theories have been proposed to explain this type of 
business expansion [Palepu, 1986]. Each theory is based on 
the underlying premise that the normative goal of 
management is to maximize shareholder wealth. For 
empirical studies, the common measure of risk adjusted 
shareholder wealth is stock price. 
Management may increase stock price by allocating 
resources to positive net present value investments. 
Successful maximization of shareholder wealth, measured as 
stock price, is achieved when all the firm's assets are 
invested in a portfolio of positive net present value 
projects. On a theoretical level, stock price should rise 
with the addition of any positive net present value 
project, without regard to the project's unique pattern of 
risk-adjusted expected future cash flows. 
The acquiring firm may find that a proposed corporate 
acquisition is a positive net present value investment. 
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Each proposed corporate acquisition will have distinctive 
expected future cash flows/risk characteristics. Thus, 
corporate acquisitions may be positive net present value 
projects for a variety of reasons [Halpern, 1983]. Five 
competing theories for the source of the positive net 
present value are discussed commonly in the literature. 
One of these, called agency theory, is the focus of this 
study. A brief discussion of each of five theories for 
corporate acquisitions follows. 
Productive Economies of scale 
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Productive economies of scale is one source of risk-
adjusted expected future cash flows which may lead to a 
positive net present value corporate acquisition. 
Productive economies of scale are said to occur when the 
postacquisition average cost per unit produced is below the 
preacquisition level. The additional expected future cost 
savings contributes to the positive net present value of 
such an acquisition. Several identifiable causes may 
contribute to the reduction in the average cost per unit. 
The least complicated scenario is one in which the 
postacquisition production quantity gives a new lower cost 
per unit equilibrium on the firm's long run average cost 
curve. A second situation occurs when labor and capital 
have unequal marginal costs of productive capacity. 
Allowing substitution of labor and capital, the 
postacquisition optimal input factor ratio may yield a 
lower cost per unit. 
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When external forces cause changes affecting the entire 
industry, the result may be a similar reduction in average 
cost per unit. For example, in periods of cost push 
inflation, the industry's long run average cost curve may 
shift or obtain a new shape. Without changing production 
plans, the preacquisition firm's operations are using 
higher priced input factors resulting in a higher long run 
average cost per unit. Postacquisition, the new level of 
production is likely to involve a different short run 
average cost curve. If the shift in the short run curve is 
sufficient, this may mitigate the effects of the cost push 
inflation. The expected future average cost per unit will 
be reduced yielding productive economies of scale. 
Financial Synergies 
A different class of acquisitions may provide financial 
synergies. The usual example involves acquisition of a 
small, young firm which is operating in a high growth, high 
risk industry. Prior to acquisition, management may have 
identified many positive net present value projects in 
their area of expertise. With limited tangible assets, no 
long term credit history, and the high risk nature of the 
industry, external funding may be difficult or almost 
impossible to secure. Even when available, the cost of 
capital may be so high that the net present value of some 
projects becomes negative. In this scenario, management 
faces budget constraints which hinder further growth. 
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Postacquisition, the combined entity encompasses a 
larger group of assets, and operates at a risk level based 
on the combined portfolio of investments. The market 
appraises the credit worthiness of the new entity in making 
funds available, and establishing a required cost of 
capital. Funds may be more readily available, and the cost 
of capital may be below that of the acquired firm alone. 
Under these conditions, the investment budget constraints 
are now less restrictive. With the addition of the new 
positiye net present value projects to the firm's 
investment portfolio, the corporate acquisition may have a 
positive net present value. 
Technological Synergies 
Technological synergies may occur when the managements 
of the acquiring and acquired firms have different skills 
and expertise. Communication and consulting may lead to 
development of new technologies for existing problems, or 
application of existing technology to new problems. In 
addition, centralization and integration of similar 
activities may justify use of expanded or improved 
equipment. When these conditions allow production of goods 
or services at a lower average cost per unit, the future 
expected cost savings contribute to the positive net 
present value of the acquisition. 
Competitive Advantage 
An attempt to alter the competitive structure of the 
industry may motivate some acquisitions. In industries 
with high barriers to entry, the number of firms tends to 
grow slowly. Thus, an intraindustry acquisition may give 
the means for a firm to increase its market share 
substantially. The high cost of entry is of prime 
importance in altering the competitive structure of the 
industry in the short run, and the basis for predicting a 
less competitive environment in the future. 
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With more limited competition in the industry and 
increased market share, the postacquisition firm may earn 
higher marginal profits. The increased marginal profits 
provide positive expected future cash flows and, after 
allowing for risk adjustments, the business acquisition may 
be a positive net present value investment. 
Reduction of Agency Costs 
An additional group of interest is one in which the 
preacquisition acquired firm is incurring excessive 
positive agency costs. Agency costs arise whenever 
management allocates firm resources such that the 
shareholders' wealth is not maximized. Such managerial 
decisions may be the result of differences in risk 
preferences between management and shareholders. Perhaps, 
the firm lacks adequate motivational incentives to ensure 
optimal use of management's expertise and authority. 
Insufficient monitoring of the manager's behavior can lead 
to inefficiency or even shirking. 
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It is both difficult and costly to develop and 
implement contracts to minimize agency costs. In a cost-
benefit analysis, elimination of all agency costs is cost 
prohibitive. Thus, even in well managed firms, many agency 
costs may be present due to the separation of ownership and 
control. However, other agency costs can be reasonably 
avoidable. These avoidable costs are termed excessive 
positive agency costs. 
For a particular cost to aptly be termed an excessive 
positive agency cost, two general conditions must hold. 
First, experts in the field must be able to identify the 
source of the agency costs clearly. Second, appropriately 
skilled individuals must be able to alleviate the problem 
within a reasonable time frame [Halpern, 1983]. When the 
excessive positive agency costs (EPAC) are eliminated or 
minimized, the cost savings will increase the expected 
future cash flows derived from the firm's net productive 
assets. 
Acquisition of such a firm may be a positive net 
present value investment opportunity. The existence of 
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EPAC is not the only requisite, however. The present value 
is based on the risk adjusted expected future cost savings. 
In addition, the analysis must include the often 
substantial costs of locating, evaluating and eventually 
affecting the acquisition. Thus, all firms with EPAC do 
not represent positive net present value investments. 
Conceivably, the same firm may be a positive net present 
value investment to one acquiring firm and not to another. 
This study will focus on acquisitions of firms with 
EPAC. The inconclusive and conflicting findings in prior 
literature motivates this research project. Empirical 
evidence will be examined to demonstrate and study this 
class of transactions. Variables of interest are 
consistent with EPAC (suggesting inadequate monitoring 
and/or inadequate managerial incentives). 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
There is a profusion of literature in the area of 
busines combinations and corporate acquisitions. Three 
main topics are addressed below. Studies examining the 
wealth effects from business combinations are reviewed 
briefly. A discussion of the findings of studies on the 
characteristics of acquired firms follows. The final 
section considers studies in agency theory. 
Wealth Effects studies 
Empirical studies on the wealth transfer of corporate 
acquisitions are often inconclusive or yield conflicting 
results. Two examples worthy of note are the market 
response based on the method of acquisition and the impact 
of the estimation period [Jensen and Ruback, 1983]. In the 
case of unsuccessful mergers, the target stock price falls 
to, or below preannouncement levels after the cancellation 
of the transaction (Dodd and Ruback, 1977]. This seems to 
be incongruent with the fact that, for up to two years 
after a failed tender offer, the target stock price remains 
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inflated [Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1983]. In the tender 
offer case, it appears that the market estimates an excess 
positive expected future cash flow in anticipation of 
future activity in the acquisition market. It is unclear 
why such an expectation is not made in the case of the 
failed merger. Earlier studies have used event periods 
ranging from a two day window to a sixty day field around 
the public announcement of the acquisition [Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983]. The direction and nature of wealth effects, 
as evidenced by abnormal returns estimated over the event 
period, appear inconsistent among studies. Findings appear 
to be highly dependent on the size of the event period. 
For example, returns on targets of unsuccessful mergers are 
consistently positive when the event window is from two 
days to two months centered on the announcement date. 
However, when the event window encompasses the eventual 
cancellation, the results are statistically insignificant 
[Jensen and Ruback, 1983]. 
The conflicting and often insignificant results of 
prior studies suggests the need for a different research 
methodolgy or a refined research design. One factor that 
is apparent in the vast majority of earlier works in the 
use of nonhomogeneous samples. Since synergies derive from 
different sources in a random set of acquisitions, the 
distinctive economic reality may impact the empirical 
evidence differentially. 
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Statistical significance is demonstrated with an 
adequate test subsample size. When the event of interest 
is relatively rare, a large general random sample may be 
required to ensure an adequate number of test firms in the 
sample. Such a sample may involve prohibitively large data 
gathering costs. When a general random sample of acquired 
firms is used in a study, the test sample of a particular 
source of takeover synergy may be inadequate. The 
interpretation of results of earlier studies is exacerbated 
since the statistical insignificance may be an artifact of 
general random sampling rather than a reflection of the 
actual underlying interrelationships. 
Thus, effective empirical examination of corporate 
acquisitions may be limited to an appropriate subpopulation 
of target firms. In one notable earlier study, statistic-
ally significant results were demonstrated for horizontal 
mergers challenged under antitrust legislation [Eckbo, 
1983]. This suggests that studies employing selective 
sampling procedures may be worthwhile. 
Characteristics of Acquired Firns 
A number of studies have attempted to build empirical 
models to predict which of a group of firms is likely to be 
the target of a corporate acquisition. Most commonly, five 
categories of accounting data have served as independent 
variables. Leverage ratios, surrogates for the capital 
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structure of the firm, tend to provide the greatest 
explanatory power [Stevens, 1973]. Other, less 
significant, independent variables include measures of 
liquidity, profitability, activity and dividend payout 
[Belkaoui, 1978 and Rege, 1984]. Sometimes employed in the 
model development are net book assets, net assets market-
to-book ratio, and industry code [Palepu, 1985]. 
Overall, the models generated by these studies yield 
unremarkable results. While the individual variable 
coefficients are significant, the overall predictive 
accuracy of the models is not substantially greater than 
chance. One possible cause for this is the use of publicly 
available data as independent variables. Assuming a 
semistrong efficient market, the models' attempt to predict 
takeover targets implies the existence of a measurable 
market imperfection. The authors above do not present the 
basis for this expected market inefficiency. On the 
contrary, it has been hypothesized that corporate takeovers 
may be a mechanism to improve market efficiency through 
reallocation of scarce resources and managerial talent 
within an industry [Manne, 1965; Gort, 1969; Benston, 
1985]. Consequently, it is not surprising that accurate 
prediction models have not been developed using publicly 
available data. 
Some prediction models have not been properly adjusted 
to compensate for sample biases. Choice-based sampling was 
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commonly used to identify the target sample. This 
technique contains data collection costs when the event of 
interest is relatively rare in the general population. The 
test sample is typically randomly drawn from the population 
of takeover targets during the period of interest. The 
resulting frequency of target firms in the estimation 
sample is much higher than in the general population of all 
firms. This technique raises several methodological 
issues. 
The choice-based data collection of the target group 
violates the assumptions underlying many statistical 
models. When these assumptions are violated, the resulting 
parameter estimates are inconsistent and asymptotically 
biased. Such a model, later applied to a random prediction 
sample, tends to overclassify target firms. Adjustments 
can be made to the statistical models to adjust for the 
discrepancy between sample and population prior 
probabilities [Zmijewski, 1984]. Such adjustments, absent 
in earlier models, may preclude reliable interpretation of 
the research findings. 
A related problem encountered in these studies is the 
failure to prudently evaluate the model's classificatory 
accuracy. The data used to generate the model should not 
be used to evaluate its predictive ability. As in the 
development of the model, during the assessment process, 
adjustments reflecting variations in sample and population 
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prior probabilities are required. The researcher must 
choose the basis for model evaluation without prejudice to 
success. 
Based on relative frequencies in the general 
population, a naive prediction rule would classify all 
firms as nontargets. Reasonably, a statistical model is 
not even minimally successful unless it makes fewer 
classification errors than the naive rule. More 
sophisticated measures of classificatory success focus on 
maximizing the number of correct designations, conditional 
upon sample proportions [McKee, Bell and Boatsman, 1984]. 
Since these criteria emphasize different types of errors, 
the ranking of a group of models is dependent upon the 
definition of classificatory success employed. 
Earlier studies failed to consider the relative cost of 
alternative misclassifications. The chosen criterion for 
classificatory success may require adjustment to reflect 
the relative significance of errors. Often, there are 
differential loss functions implicit in Type I versus Type 
II classificatory errors. When this is the case, an 
appropriate measure of model accuracy will incorporate the 
relative costs of misclassifications [Dopuch, Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1987]. 
Agency Theory 
The essence of agency theory is the study of the 
effects of the separation of ownership and direct control 
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of productive assets [Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. Both 
owners and managers allocate scarce resources based on 
their individual utility functions. The owners' expected 
utility may be a function of risk-adjusted expected future 
cash flows from stock ownership. Managers' expected utility 
is affected by expected future remuneration including 
perquisites, effort required and risk faced by both the 
individual and the firm. Differences in risk preferences, 
along with these other distinctions, may result in owners' 
and managers' unique utility functions. 
For any given situation, owners' expected utility may 
be maximized by one intraf irm resource allocation and 
managers' may be maximized by a dissimilar allocation. 
Managers, having authority over the immediate action, 
implement the decision which maximizes their expected 
utility. The resulting loss in the owners' expected 
utility is termed agency costs. Some minimal level of 
positive agency costs is present in all firms with widely 
held stock. Higher levels of agency costs may be the 
result of poor decision making skills, inadequate research 
and poor identification of future trends or problems, 
excessive perquisite consumption, or suboptimal levels of 
managerial effort expended by managers. 
In an effort to minimize agency costs, special 
contracts are written to compensate and evaluate managers 
[Baiman, 1983]. The manager and owner may have more 
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congruent preferences when at least a part of the managers' 
compensation is in the form of stock or stock options. 
Incentives to invest optimal effort are created by 
specifying performance evaluation measures and tying 
current/future compensation directly to those measures 
[Healy, 1983]. A cost-benefit analysis guides development 
and implementation of these special contracts. 
Adequate enforcement of these contracts demands 
reliable monitoring of the managers' performance in the 
dynamic business environment. Faithful reporting and 
performance evaluation are demanded by managers and owners 
alike. External auditing is an important aspect of 
monitoring managers' behavior [Ng and Stoeckenius, 1980]. 
The audit committee serves a special function in resolving 
disputes between the firm's management and the external 
auditor. The goal is to ensure effective, unbiased 
monitoring of managers' behavior. 
Relevant variables for empirical work in agency theory 
may be drawn from the compensation and auditing areas. Few 
attempts have been made to combine these agency variables 
with financial market variables [Mikkelson and Ruback, 
1985]. This study will do just that in the special case of 
a class of acquired firms. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Question 
This study examines firms which may have excessive 
positive agency costs. Such a firm may be an attractive 
target for a corporate acquisition. These firms are 
expected to display firm-specific characteristics related 
to the uncontained agency costs. A group of similar firms 
drawn from the general population is expected to display 
these firm-specific characteristics much less frequently. 
The following hypothesis is the focus of this study. 
Ho: The identified group of target firms does not 
exhibit characteristics consistent with excessive 
positive agency costs more frequently than the 
identified group of nontarget firms. 
Ha: The identified group of target firms does exhibit 
characteristics consistent with excessive positive 
agency costs more frequently than the identified 
group of nontarget firms. 
Rejection of the null hypothesis would support the 
premise that the presence of excessive positive agency 
costs motivates an identifiable class of corporate 
acquisitions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis would 
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not support this explanation for corporate acquisitions. 
Appropriate selection of the test sample and identification 
of pertinent variables are crucial features of the research 
design. Misidentification of test firms or 
misspecification of variables may preclude demonstration of 
statistically significant relationships. Further 
discussion of these issues follows below. 
Sample Selection 
Test Sample Identification 
Since EPAC reduce expected future cash flows, the stock 
of a firm with EPAC would be expected to exhibit 
substandard overall performance. Such a firm is called a 
poor performer (PP). A firm may be a PP for a variety of 
reasons, only one being the presence of EPAC. The research 
hypothesis tests whether the PP target firms have 
characteristics which are generally consistent with the 
presence of EPAC. Two samples of PP firms are needed to 
test the research hypothesis. One sample are ex post 
targets of corporate acquisitions and the other sample are 
firms which have not been targets during the test period. 
Prior empirical studies have not provided clear 
guidelines for the identification of a PP firm which may 
have EPAC. Although some argue that market efficiency 
makes the extended viability of a firm with EPAC doubtful 
[Benston, 1985], the semistrong form does not preclude the 
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continued existence of a firm with EPAC. Market efficiency 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition to eliminate 
firms with moderate agency costs from the market. 
Cost-benefit analysis underlies the rational decision 
process leading to market efficiency. The semistrong form 
concept encompasses some market frictions and 
inefficiencies. As discussed earlier, not all firms with 
EPAC are viable targets of a corporate acquisition. The 
firm will become a target only when the expected future 
cash flows exceed the cost of identification and correction 
of the firm's EPAC plus the basic acquisition cost to the 
acquiring firm. When this condition does not hold, the 
firm with EPAC may continue to function as an independent 
entity indefinitely or until the condition is met for 
consideration as a possible target firm. 
Sample Filter Criterion 
The methodological problem becomes empirical 
identification of PP firms. The population of target and 
nontarget firms must be stratified appropriately into nonPP 
and PP subpopulations. A sample filter will be used to 
make this distinction. A suitable sample filter criterion 
will allow the following hypothesis to be tested. 
H0 : The sample firm is a poor performer. 
Ha: The sample firm is not a poor performer. 
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As information reaches the market suggesting the 
presence of EPAC, the efficient market will impute the 
risk-adjusted reduced expected future cash flows into the 
equilibrium stock price. The market will continue to make 
adjustments in the equilibrium stock price as further 
evidence confirms uncontained EPAC. Over time the stock 
price will suffer discrete permanent reductions relative to 
other risky assets. The information relating to EPAC may 
reach the market at random intervals from a variety of 
sources. 
Thus, there is no identifiable event date for empirical 
estimation of abnormal returns. In addition, temporary 
fluctuations in stock price may be unrelated to long term 
EPAC. A sustained pattern of poor market performance 
provides ex post evidence of permanent downward revisions 
of the stock's expected future cash flows. The effects of 
temporary fluctuations in relative stock price may be 
mitigated by estimating abnormal returns across wide time 
intervals. 
Cumulative average residual (CAR) provides a measure 
of long term market performance. A PP is a firm with 
substandard risk-adjusted expected future cash flows. This 
results in a reduced return on the PP stock and a 
substandard CAR. Since, over extended periods, the market 
portfolio of risky assets tends to earn a non-zero, 
positive return, it is possible that a PP may have a 
negative, zero or even a small positive CAR during the 
estimation period. 
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The sample filter criterion is based on a sample 
standard CAR. The construction of the sample filter must 
embody the differential loss functions of Type I (alpha) 
and Type II (beta) sampling errors. A Type I error occurs 
if the filter criterion identifies a nonPP as a PP. A Type 
II error is the classification of a PP as a nonPP. The 
research hypothesis is offered only for the special class 
of PP firms. As discussed earlier, failure to properly 
identify the relevant sample may prevent a statistically 
significant demonstration of valid phenomenon. Thus, a 
Type I error is far more deleterious to the study's results 
than a Type II misclassification. 
The sample filter criterion must involve a very low 
alpha error. A somewhat larger beta error is acceptable. 
The firms with CARs in the bottom quartile of the sample 
are here operationally defined as PP. The PP target firms 
will be examined as a test sample. The PP in the nontarget 
group will be examined as a comparison sample. 
Variable Definition 
Executive Compensation 
Managerial compensation contracts are written to 
motivate executive performance. They offer incentives for 
optimal use of managerial effort and talent. These same 
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contracts provide disincentives for undesirable behaviors 
which may be related to EPAC. These compensation plans 
often tie current period remuneration to some measure of 
firm performance. 
There are a variety of measures of firm performance 
which may be assessed across differing time periods. The 
definition of firm performance and the measurement time 
horizon have substantial impact on the manager's decision 
processes and behavior. The manager maximizes his expected 
utility when the performance criterion is at an optimal 
level. Agency costs may be controlled or reduced when the 
performance criterion leads to congruence of the manager's 
and stockholders' utility functions. 
In the aggregate, the stockholders' investment holding 
period may be viewed as indefinite. The long term 
viability of the firm is the most serious concern. A 
manager's relatively briefer involvement with the firm may 
motivate him to allocate firm resources such that the 
firm's short term profitability is maximized. Such a 
decision may hinder the firm's long range strategic 
position. This discrepancy in time frame emphasized is a 
source of agency costs. A compensation contract may 
minimize these costs by tying the manager's current period 
remuneration to some measure of long term firm performance. 
Such a contract is referred to as a long term compensation 
plan. 
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There is significant diversity in the choice of 
performance criterion among long term compensation plans. 
As a measure designed to contain agency costs, perhaps the 
most effective contracts use stock price as a measure of 
long term firm performance. Of obvious interest to 
stockholders, under the long term compensation plan, stock 
price serves as a basis for determining the manager's 
current period remuneration. The manager's decisions to 
allocates firm resources are made to maximize his personal 
wealth, and the wealth of the stockholder is maximized 
simultaneously. 
For this study, a long term compensation plan is 
defined as any stock option, stock bonus or combination 
plan. Theory suggests that firms with without long term 
compensation packages are more likely to incur EPAC. Thus, 
PP firms with long term compensation plans are less likely 
to have EPAC. Similarly, PP firms without long term 
compensation packages are more likely to have EPAC. The 
null hypothesis of the basic research question is rejected 
if PP targets have long term executive compensation plans 
less frequently than PP nontargets. 
The relationship between executive compensation and 
firm profitability provides another variable of interest. 
Executives are charged with profitable management of the 
firm assets. One measure of their success is return on the 
common stock. overall, PP firms, as defined here, have 
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substandard return on common stock during the test period. 
When firm assets are consistently earning a relatively low 
return, control of agency costs implies that current period 
executive compensation should reflect the relatively 
unfruitful management. In a PP without EPAC, average 
current period executive compensation is expected to be 
below the industry average. Empirical support for the 
basic research question will be found if the average 
current period executive compensation as a percentage of 
industry average tends to be lower in the nontarget group 
than in the group of target firms. 
The Auditing Function 
Control of agency costs requires appropriate monitoring 
of the executive's behavior. The audit function is serves 
as an external monitor of performance. Knowledge that his 
work will be audited may motivate the executive to optimal 
effort levels. At least, it may provide a deterrent to 
negligent or willful misallocation of firm resources. 
Variables which suggest the possibility of a weakness in 
the audit function are consistent with the possibility of 
EPAC. Three such variables have been identified. 
One of the functions of the board of directors is to 
oversee the relationship between the external auditor and 
the firm's employees. The board is responsible for the 
appointment of the external auditor, and the review of the 
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auditor's work. The board must handle the resolution of 
any auditor-management disputes. These specialized duties 
are assigned to the audit committee, a select subgroup of 
the board of directors. 
In an agency theory context, the audit committee 
oversees the audit-monitoring function for the 
stockholders. When an audit committee has not been 
appointed, the board may not view that task with the 
appropriate importance. A PP with EPAC may have a poor 
monitoring system and no audit committee. 
The importance of the audit committee is fairly well 
recognized. The New York Stock Exchange and the American 
Stock Exchange require that listees have a specifically 
identified audit committee. The recommendations of the 
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting [1987) reiterate the importance of the audit 
committee in monitoring employee behavior. However, firms 
listed on the Over-the-counter Exchange (OTC) are not 
required to appoint a specific audit committee on the board 
of directors. 
This study will examine the empirical relationship 
between the existence of an audit committee and the 
presence of EPAC. Therefore, both the target and nontarget 
samples are drawn from the population of OTC firms. The 
research hypothesis is supported if the target sample has 
specially designated audit committees less frequency than 
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the nontarget sample. 
Beyond the mere existence of the audit committee, its 
composition may impact its effectiveness in controlling 
EPAC. The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting [1987, p. 41] states that a specific 
audit committee is a necessary but not sufficient provision 
to properly monitor the employees' behavior. There is a 
strong recommendation that only independent, outside 
directors serve on the audit committee. The report 
emphasizes the independence of each member as an important 
component of the effectiveness of the audit committee in 
overseeing the audit/monitoring function. 
It can be hypothesized that the audit committees of PPs 
with EPAC will have a low percentage of outside directors. 
This study defines an outside director as one who is so 
noted on the firm's annual report. The research hypothesis 
will be empirically supported the audit committee of the 
target firms have a lower percentage of outside directors 
than those of the nontarget sample. 
A third variable of interest in the audit area relates 
to the tenure of the external auditor. The audit committee 
is charged with the responsibility of reappointment, or 
discharge of the external auditor. The external auditor 
may fail to be reappointed for a variety of reasons. If 
the firm's management is incurring EPAC, they may encourage 
the discharge of an auditor who too closely inspects 
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discretionary resource allocations. Frequent external 
auditor changes suggest the possibility that detection of 
EPAC may be hampered. The research hypothesis is supported 
if target firms exhibit more frequent external auditor 
changes during the test period than nontarget firms. 
To summarize, five variables have been identified. A 
group of firms which may have EPAC is expected to show the 
following characteristics: relatively few long term exec-
utive compensation packages, above industry average current 
period executive compensation, relatively infrequent audit 
committees with a relatively low percentage of outside 
directors and relatively frequent changes of external 
auditor. The research hypothesis will be supported if the 
target group can be distinguished from the nontarget group 
of firms on the basis of these characteristics. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Sample Selection 
As discussed above, all sample firms were drawn from 
those traded in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. The 
sample of target firms was drawn from the record of 
acquisition activity in the period January 1985 - December 
1986 as listed in Mergers and Acquisitions. A firm is 
defined as a target if, during the period, another firm 
purchased sufficient voting stock to constitute an interest 
in excess of twenty percent, or one designated as a 
controlling interest. Since prior studies suggest that the 
returns on the stock of target and/or acquiring firms may 
be affected by activity in the acquisition market, 
estimation of abnormal returns may be confounded for a firm 
which was both a target and an acquiring firm during the 
period. Therefore, any firm which had additional reported 
activity in the corporate acquisition market during the 
period January 1978 - December 1986 was eliminated from the 
sample. A total of 353 target firms were identified. 
The population of nontarget firms consisted of all of 
the OTC firms on the Compustat Research files with complete 
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data for the period January 1978 - December 1986. Firms 
which had activity in the corporate acquisition market 
reported in Mergers and Acquisitions during the period were 
dropped from further consideration. A group of 274 
nontarget comparison firms was identified. 
Sample Research Design 
The relationship between the test sample and the 
comparison sample has significant bearing on the overall 
research design. When two independent random samples are 
taken from two different populations, statistical analysis 
allows inference about the differences between the two 
populations. Although a related samples design may produce 
a smaller error term and greater precision may be achieved, 
this study employs an independent samples design (Roscoe, 
1975]. No attempt is made to match the PP-target firms and 
the PP-nontarget firms on any specific criterion. A 
discussion of the rationale for this sample research design 
choice follows. 
Firm Size 
There is evidence to suggest that acquired firms tend 
to be relatively smaller than nonacquired firms in the same 
industry (Palepu, 1985]. Some prior research suggests that 
firm size may be a good discriminator between the target 
and nontarget samples. One of the explanations offered for 
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this phenomenon relates to the cost of funding the 
acquisition cost [Stevens, 1973]. When the acquiring firm 
requires external funding of all or part of the acquisition 
cost, these financing costs must be included in the 
evaluation of the investment opportunity. These added 
costs decrease the likelihood that the proposed acquisition 
will represent a positive net present value project. As 
the size of a prospective target firm increases, the 
acquiring firm may require a greater amount of external 
funding. These funds may be available only at a rising 
marginal cost. As these costs increase, the net present 
value of the proposed acquisition drops and may become 
negative. Following this line of reasoning, it is not 
surprising to observe that acquired firms tend to be 
smaller than acquiring firms. 
Firm size may serve as a surrogate for another of the 
independent variables of interest here. The extent and/or 
quality of the audit function may be affected by firm size. 
Expert internal auditors may find larger firms provide 
better career opportunities. In addition, development and 
maintenance of a sophisticated internal auditing staff 
requires utilizes funds that smaller firms may lack. Even 
as small firms may have difficulty attracting managers with 
the highest level of expertise, a similar problem may arise 
in obtaining experts to serve on the audit committee of the 
board of directors. Thus, there may be some inverse 
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relationship between firm size and the monitoring value of 
the audit function. As these effects serve to mitigate the 
problems leading to excessive positive agency costs, firm 
size may be a proxy for the audit variables of interest in 
this study. 
To summarize, target firms are observed to be smaller 
than the acquiring firms. This size factor is likely to 
serve as a proxy for financing costs, managerially related 
agency costs, and the audit function. Research designs 
which utilize firm size as a criterion variable are likely 
to capture these effects as well as absolute value of the 
asset base. Since this study attempts to utilize 
independent variables related to the efficiency and extent 
of the audit function, use of firm size as a matching 
criterion variable would prohibit testing of the basic 
research hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, firm size may contain significant 
differential information for the particular firms in this 
study. An examination of the empirical firm size data was 
warranted. Total assets serves as a measure of size for 
all sample firms. When the samples contain a nearly equal 
number of observations, the t-test detects differences 
between sample means without being sensitive to 
nonnormality of sample distributions and nonhomogeneity of 
sample variances. Therefore, a t-test was performed to 
ensure that failure to include firm size in the variable 
set does not result in the omission of significant 
information content. 
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Thirty-one target firms and thirty-seven nontarget 
firms comprised the final samples in this study. The mean 
size was computed for the final target and the nontarget 
samples as $1,867,500 and $2,109,700 respectively. The 
computed t-statistic of 1.78, with sixty-six degrees of 
freedom, was compared with the critical value of 2.00. The 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis at .05 level of 
significance. This implies that firm size can be omitted 
without significantly biasing the model. 
Industry Classification 
It has been observed that, within any small finite time 
span, corporate acquisition activity tends to be 
concentrated in one or two industry classes [Jensen, 1984]. 
An example of the theory of economic disturbance provides 
insight into this phenomenon [Gort, 1969]. An interesting 
case occurs when secondary product demand increases beyond 
the current short run industry supply. The higher 
profitability that tends to result from the new equilibrium 
will attract new firms to the industry. However, if the 
industry has few barriers to entry, new firms may emerge 
quickly. These new firms increase the demand for 
managerial talent. The demand may exceed the short run 
supply of qualified, experienced individuals. New, 
developing firms are the ones most likely to be forced to 
hire managers with only marginal expertise. 
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As the industry product supply and demand reach a long 
term equilibrium, the rate of return to firms in the 
industry falls to a new equilibrium. The higher rates of 
return earned during the period of industry expansion may 
have mitigated the effects of inefficiencies and relatively 
inexperienced managers. These same inefficiencies may 
become EPAC in a stable, slow-growth industry. Firms in 
this situation may become attractive targets for 
intraindustry acquisitions. Managers of the acquiring firm 
already have specialized expertise which may facilitate 
elimination of EPAC. Thus, within any finite period of 
time, industry classification and stability may serve as a 
proxy for variables indicating managerial inefficiencies. 
An examination of the industry classifications of the 
final thirty-one target and thirty-seven nontarget firms 
was made. This provides insight into any discriminatory 
power which may be lost due to the omission of industry 
classification from the model. The industry proportions 
for the final target and nontarget samples are 
respectively: financial institutions and insurance, 38% and 
22%; petroleum drilling and refining, 29% and 35%; retail 
sales, 16% and 19%; manufacturing, 13% and 22%; other, 3% 
and 2%. The data indicates that neither sample is 
dominated by a single industry. Significant discriminatory 
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power is not likely to be lost by the omission of industry 
classification from the variable set. 
Independent Samples Design 
Empirical studies employing proxy variables may succeed 
in distinguishing between two different populations. 
However, little insight or understanding is gained into the 
underlying phenomenon when the criterion variable proxies 
several specific characteristics at once. A sample 
research design which matches the test firms and the 
comparison firms on firm size and/or industry 
classification may match, in essence, on the underlying 
independent variables of this study. The research question 
itself would become moot in this application. 
An independent samples research design is used here 
with no attempt to match the target and nontarget firms on 
any characteristic. Firms which meet all criteria for 
target or nontarget groups are subjected to the PP test 
using the sample filter criterion described above. PP-
target firms and PP-nontarget firms comprise the final 
samples for the study. 
Identification of Poor Performers 
Identification Time Period 
Evidence in earlier studies suggests that a firm may be 
identified as a potential target up to two years before any 
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formal negotiations commence [Bradley, Desai and Kim, 
1983]. Generally, firms in this potential target group are 
expected to earn positive abnormal returns if and when the 
acquisition is affected. The market discounts these 
expected positive abnormal returns into the pre-negotiation 
stock price. Thus, it is possible that such firms will 
begin yielding small positive abnormal returns as early as 
two years before the acquisition. 
It may be impossible to identify PP firms using the 
sample filter criterion during this two year period. The 
small positive abnormal returns earned in anticipation of 
acquisition may offset negative abnormal returns due to 
substandard firm performance. Thus, a PP firm which the 
market considers to be a potential target of a future 
acquisition may fail to meet the PP test based on the 
sample filter criterion. The two year period prior to 
takeover was eliminated from the PP identification analysis 
in order to control for this bias. To avoid potential 
temporal effects, a similar two year period is not 
considered as the comparison group is stratified into PP 
and non-PP firms. 
Sample Filter Criterion 
A market model test provided a criterion used as a 
sample filter. Monthly stock price data was collected for 
the period January 1978 - December 1982. Data for target 
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firms was gathered from the Interactive Data Corporation 
Stock Guide. The Compustat Research File provided data for 
nontarget firms. Complete data sets were collected for 207 
of the target firms. 221 nontarget firms had the required 
number of observations. 
A two parameter market model was estimated for the 
period January 1978 -December 1980 for each firm. This 
eliminates the two year period prior to acquisition for the 
target firms. Data for the nontarget firms was collected 
for the same period. Employing the Standard and Poor's 500 
as a proxy for the market portfolio, monthly abnormal 
returns were computed for the period January 1981 -
December 1982. These abnormal returns were used to compute 
a twenty four month cumulative abnormal residual (CAR) for 
each firm. The CAR captures the overall unexpected market 
performance of the stock for the twenty four month period. 
The CAR is relatively insensitive to minor temporal 
deviations from estimated market relationships. 
The firms in the quartile with the most negative CAR 
values are designated as PP. However, it is possible that 
a transient change in stock price could produce a 
sufficiently large abnormal return to dominate the other 
data values. In this case, the CAR would misrepresent the 
actual long term market performance. To control for this 
possibility, an outliers test was performed. A visual 
examination of the stream of monthly abnormal returns 
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identified any outliers. An observed outlier was removed 
from the data set and the CAR was recomputed based on the 
remaining twenty three observations. The twenty three 
month CAR was used to reclassify the firm on the basis of 
the sample filter criterion. In order to achieve a small 
alpha error, if the twenty three month CAR changed a firm's 
classification, it was dropped from the sample. 
The cutoff for the quartile of the most negative CAR in 
the target group was -.009. The CAR for fifty two firms 
fell below this value and were classified as PP. When the 
outliers test was performed, six firms were classified as 
non-PP on the basis of the twenty three month CAR. After 
these six firms had been deleted from the sample, a total 
of forty six firms remained for further analysis. 
The CAR cutoff for the bottom quartile in the 
comparison group was +.011. As defined earlier, a PP is 
expected to have a nonpositive CAR. Therefore, the CAR 
cutoff was set at 0.00. This resulted in the elimination 
of three firms from the sample. Two firms were dropped 
from further consideration during the outliers test. The 
final sample consisted of forty nine PP nontarget firms. 
Subsample Randomization 
When a firm is first identified as a possible target of 
a corporate acquisition, the values of the variables of 
interest may be affected. In addition, economy wide events 
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may have a differential temporal influence over the 
variable estimation period, January 1981 - December 1982. 
Should these biases exist, observed differences between the 
target and nontarget samples may be artifacts of temporal 
effects. To minimize the probability of this problem 
occurring, both calendar years of the variable estimation 
period were represented equitably in both samples. 
A subsample randomization procedure achieves this goal. 
Both the target and the nontarget samples were bisected, 
with each firm randomly assigned to one of the two 
subgroups, A and B. Annualized variables for firms in 
subgroup A were measured for the calendar (reporting) year 
1981. Calendar (reporting) year 1982 was the measurement 
period for firms in subgroup B. 
Variable Estimation 
Data for each firm was collected for the appropriate 
subgroup time period. Part III of the Form 10-K provided 
evidence of the presence of a long term compensation plan 
for middle or upper executives. Any stock option, stock 
bonus or other such plan qualifies as a long term 
compensation plan. The same section of the Form 10-K 
revealed cash payments to executives for salaries and fees. 
Figures for industry averages of annual cash compensation 
were drawn from The National Income and Product Accounts of 
the United States, 1929 - 1982, published by the U.S. 
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Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The firm's annual report indicated the existence of an 
audit committee, and the number of audit committee members 
noted as outside directors. The number of external auditor 
changes was measured over the three year period 1979 - 1981 
or 1980 - 1982 respectively. An 8-K Form must be filed 
with the SEC, when the board of directors elects not to 
reengage the external auditor. Summaries of 8-K form 
filings with the SEC were used to gather data on external 
auditor changes. 
After the data collection procedures outlined above, 
twelve of the PP nontarget firms and fifteen of the target 
PP firms had incomplete data. Thus, thirty-one target PP 
firms provided the sample for testing of the basic research 
hypothesis. Complete data was available for thirty-seven 
PP nontarget firms. Table I provides a reconciliation of 
the original sample collected and the final samples used in 
the statistical model. 
Probit Analysis 
Basic Model 
A multivariate probit model was used to analyze the 
relationship between the two samples of PP firms and the 
identified independent variables. A probit model is 
appropriate since the dependent variable, sample 
membership, is dichotomous. The dependent variable is 
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predicted on the basis of the set of independent variables, 
X1 1 X2 1 ••• ,Xj· The probit procedure estimates a linear 
relationship between the independent variables, and the 
random, normally distributed dependent variable, Zi. 
Parameter estimates computed using a maximum-likelihood 
technique are consistent, asymptotically efficient, and 
asymptotically normally distributed. A t statistic can be 
used to test whether the parameter estimates are 
significantly different than zero. The basic probit 
formulation used in this study appears below. 
Zi indicates whether the firm is in the target of the 
comparison sample. Xii denotes the presence of a long term 
executive compensation plan. x2 i represents the firm's 
cash compensation to executive as a percentage of the 
industry average. x3 i is used to code the presence of an 
audit committee on the board of directors and x4 i to 
represent the percentage of outside directors on the audit 
committee. Xsi is the number of changes the firm's board 
of directors made in the external auditor during the three 
year test period. 
Jackknife Procedure 
Generally, to assess the classificatory success of a 
model such as the one in this study, a random holdout 
40 
sample is formed and the model is estimated using the 
remaining data. Data from the holdout group is evaluated 
using the estimated model parameters. The resulting 
predicted classification of the holdout observations can be 
compared to the actual group membership. The frequency of 
correct classifications is the basis for evaluation of the 
model's usefulness. 
With the limited number of observations in each sample 
group, it is not possible to form a reasonably sized 
holdout sample. An alternative procedure, called 
jackknifing, allowed both model estimation and evaluation 
of its classificatory success. 
The jackknife procedure is an iterative approach to 
model estimation/evaluation. In the initial phase, a 
single observation is designated as the holdout sample. 
The model is estimated using the remaining observations, 
and the resulting parameters are used to predict the 
classification of the holdout observation. The predicted 
classification is compared to the actual group membership. 
A correct classification, if it occurs, is recorded. In 
the second iteration, the initial holdout observation is 
returned to the data set and a different observation is 
designated as a holdout sample. The process as described 
above continues throughout the entire sample. The result 
is a predicted classification, either correct or incorrect, 
for each data item in the sample. This provides a 
sufficient number of model predictions to compute a 
statistical measure of the classificatory success of the 
model. 
Classificatory Success of the Model 
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Several alternative measures of classificatory success 
are available [McKee, Bell and Boatsman, 1984]. The 
proportional choice criterion is used to measure the 
predictive accuracy of the model developed in this study. 
This statistic is the probability that the correct 
classifications occurred observations by chance. The 
computation appears below. 
The sample proportion of firms in the target group is 
denoted as k. The sample proportion is the conditional 
probability of correct classification into the target 
group. k2 is the product of the conditional probabilities. 
The sample proportion of comparison firms is noted as (1 -
k). A similar analysis shows that (1 - k)2 is the product 
of conditional probabilities of correct assignment into the 
comparison group. The sum of the two products represents 
the probability of correct classifications based on chance 
assignment to groups. 
Cm, a measure of the actual classificatory success of 
the model was made by substituting k' fork and (1 - k') 
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for (1 - k) above. Herek' and (1 - k') represent the 
proportion of correct model classifications made into the 
target and nontarget groups respectively. A direct 
comparison of Cm and Cpro is appropriate since both derive 
from actual sample proportions. 
A Z transformation allowed hypothesis testing on the 
classificatory success of the model. This test determines 
whether the model's predictive accuracy is significantly 
better than classifications made by chance. The test 
statistic appears below. 
Z' = 
k'- c m 
{ [Cm(l - Cm)J*(l/N) }"5 
N represents the total sample size. k 1 and Cm are as 
before. The computed statistic Z' can be compared to the 
critical z value from a standard normal table at the 
desired level of significance. If Z' is greater than the 
critical Z, the model predicts better than chance at the 
appropriate level of significance. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Results 
The entire ~ample consisting of thirty-one test firms 
and thirty-seven comparison firms was used in the 
statistical analysis as described above. The results of 
the multivariate probit model appear in Table II. All of 
the parameter estimates have the signs predicted by the 
theory. 
T-statistics were computed to permit hypothesis testing 
for each parameter. The null hypothesis states that the 
parameter is not significantly greater than (less than) 
zero. Critical values were compared to the computed t-
statistics reported in Table II. The null hypothesis was 
rejected at the five percent level of significance for two 
of the parameters. The related variables are the presence 
of an audit committee and changes in the external auditor. 
The null hypothesis was rejected at the ten percent level 
of significance for the constant term. Results indicate a 
failure to reject the null hypothesis for all other 
parameters in the model. 
The classificatory success of the model was assessed 
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using the Z transformation described above. The chance 
probability of correct assignment, Cproi was computed as 
.504. This represents the success rate of a model which is 
based on chance assignment of the observations. Based on 
the jackknife technique, the model correctly classified 
forty-eight or 70.6% of the observations. 38.7% of the 
targets were misclassified and 16.2% of the comparison 
firms were misclassified. Using the formula given in the 
previous section, the z value was computed as 3.33. This 
value is significant at the .01 level. 
The sampling procedure used in the study may affect the 
model specification. Choice-based sampling is used to 
extract a sufficient sample size when the dependent 
variable of interest is relatively rare in the general 
population, The resulting research sample proportion may 
be significantly different than the population frequency. 
Analytical methods must be adjusted or prediction error 
rates may be understated and parameter estimates may be 
biased [Zmijewski, 1984]. 
Corporate takeovers are relatively rare in the general 
population of firms, but the actual frequency in the 
special population of poor performers is uncertain. Casual 
observation in the financial institution industry suggests 
that frequency of acquisitions of PP may be greater than 
that in the general economy. However, if the sample 
proportion of 46% exceeds the actual rate for PP, the 
parameter estimates reported above may be biased and the 
classificatory success of the model may be overstated. 
A second model was estimated to test for the presence 
of bias. The relative frequency of the comparison firms 
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was increased by 300% in a weighted probit model. The new 
proportion of test firms in the sample is 21%. This may be 
more representative of actual poor performer population 
frequencies. 
The results from the weighted multivariate probit model 
appear in Table III. All of the parameter estimates have 
the same predicted signs as the original model. These 
signs are consistent with the relationships derived from 
agency theory. 
T-statistics were computed to permit hypothesis testing 
for each parameter. The null hypothesis states that the 
parameter is not significantly greater than (less than) 
zero. Critical values were compared to the computed t-
statistics reported in Table III. The null hypothesis was 
rejected at the fifteen percent level of significance for 
the parameter estimates for the constant term, the audit 
committee and the auditor changes. 
The weighted multivariate probit model correctly 
classified 80.7% of all firms. However, only 29% of the 
· target firms were properly categorized. 5.4% of the 
nontarget firms were classified as targets and 48.4% of the 
target firms were misclassified by the weighted model. 
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The weighted model incorporated 145 observations (31 target 
firms plus 37 comparison firms each with a weighting factor 
of three). These proportions were used to compute the 
chance probability of correct assignment, Cpro for the 
weighted probit model. Cpro was .664. Using the z 
transformation, the overall classificatory success of the 
weighted model was assessed. The z value of 3.65 is 
significant at the .01 level. 
Conclusions 
Based on the statistical testing using the Z 
transformation, the model developed in this study does 
perform significantly better than random assignment of the 
observations. This lends empirical support to the 
hypothesis that a certain class of target firms exhibit 
characteristics consistent with the presence of excessive 
positive agency costs. 
The two independent variables, audit committee and 
changes in external auditor, appear to have significant 
discriminatory power in the model. In the study sample, 
PP-targets tended to have an audit committee less 
frequently than the PP-nontargets. This is consistent with 
the view that a specially appointed audit committee 
provides extra monitoring that aids in controlling 
excessive positive agency costs. The significance of the 
changes in external auditor variable is consistent with the 
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hypothesis that dismissal of the auditor may result from 
disagreements over management's use of alternative 
discretionary accounting procedures to camouflage excessive 
positive agency costs in the financial statements. 
Although the number of outside directors was not 
significant, this may be due to the dichotomous coding of 
the audit committee variable. Substantial collinearity 
between the audit committee and the outside director 
variables may have dominated any marginal information 
contained in the director variable. Thus, the formulation 
here may not provide conclusive insight into the importance 
of the independent director on the audit committee. 
The results of the weighted probit analysis suggest the 
parameter estimates in the original model may be biased. 
However, the weighted model still achieves a classificatory 
success rate significantly greater than chance. The same 
variables seem to contribute discriminatory power to the 
model. 
The results of this study are consistent with the 
report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (Treadway Commission). The Commission 
recommended that the SEC require all firms to have audit 
committees comprised of independent directors. A finer 
discrimination of the reasons for auditor dismissal might 
provide further insight into the significance of such a 
change. This is not currently possible since the SEC Form 
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8-K's provide little real information concerning the 
underlying reason for the auditor change. The Treadway 
Commission exhorted the SEC to require additional 
disclosure of the nature of the disagreements with the 
previous auditor and the preengagment discussions with the 
new auditor. The SEC responded with recently implemented 
additional disclosure requirements. With further 
refinements in both theory and variable definition, future 
studies of this type may provide guidance for regulatory 
agencies in requiring additional disclosures or provide 
support for recommendations for changes in corporate 
organizational structure. 
Implications for Future Research 
This study suggests that further empirical work in the 
area of agency theory may be fruitful. Refinements in both 
theory and variable definitions may yield models with 
superior discriminatory power. Further studies may provide 
guidance for regulatory agencies in mandating additional 
disclosures. The issue of auditor changes continues to be 
of interest to the auditing profession. Addition empirical 
investigations may offer useful insights into the impact of 
auditor changes. 
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TABLE I 
RECONCILIATION OF ORIGINAL DATA 
AND SAMPLE USED IN PROBIT MODEL 
TEST (TARGET) 
FIRMS 
FIRMS ORIGINALLY 353 
IDENTIFIED 
FIRMS ELIMINATED DUE TO: 
INCOMPLETE MARKET DATA 146 
23 MONTH CAR ABOVE 155 
THE PP CUTOFF VALUE 
OUTLIERS TEST CHANGED 6 
FIRM'S PP CLASSIFICATION 
INCOMPLETE AGENCY 15 
VARIABLE DATA 
SAMPLE FOR PROBIT MODEL 31 
53 
COMPARISON 
FIRMS 
274 
53 
170 
2 
12 
37 
54 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF PROBIT ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable: O = Test Firm 1 = Comparison Firm 
Variable Parameter Standard T -
Estimate Error Statistic 
Constant 2.386 1. 709 1. 396 
** Long Term Comp. 0.051 0.318 0.161 
Salaries - 1. 598 1. 210 1. 320 
Audit Committee - 0.972 0.497 1. 954 * 
outside Director - 0.472 2.652 0.178 
Auditor Change - 0.616 0.322 1. 915 * 
* significant at alpha level of 0.05 in a one tail test 
** significant at alpha level of 0.10 in a one tail test 
55 
TABLE III 
RESULTS OF WEIGHTED PROBIT ANALYSIS 
Dependent Variable: o = Test Firm 1 = Comparison Firm 
Variable Parameter Standard T -
Estimate Error Statistic 
Constant 4.015 1. 515 2.650 
* Long Term Comp. 0.750 0.257 2.918 
* Salaries - 1. 954 1. 029 1.899 
Audit Committee - 1.063 0.428 2.484 * Outside Director - 0.932 2.334 0.399 
Auditor Change - 0.602 0.268 2.315 * 
* significant at an alpha level of 0.15 in a one tail test 
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